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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corporation, 
aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE, INC., a 
corporation; WILLIAM R. STEVENSON; 
PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, INC., a 
corporation dba SKYLINE REALTY; 
HARRY F. REED and GARY COLE, 
Case No. 17359 
Defendants-Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant incorporates by reference the Statement of 
the Nature of the Case contained in Appellant's original Brief. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant incorporates by reference the recitation of 
the Disposition in Lower Court contained in Appellant's 
original Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant incorporates by reference the Relief Sought 
on Appeal as contained in Appellant's original Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant answers Respondents' Statements of Facts in 
the following particulars: 
1. In paragraph 9 on page 5 of the Brief of Respon-
dents Park City Reservations, Inc. ("PCR, Inc."), Reed and 
Cole (collectively "PCR"), counsel for PCR states: 
PCR disagrees with Appellant that there was no 
evidence profferred or presented that any Assumed 
Name Certificate had been filed. PCR specifically 
asserts that a proffer was made that in fact the 
Assumed Name Certificate had been filed. (T.651, 
653.) 
While the Transcript at pages 650-653 indicates that counsel 
for PCA profferred proof to show that Reed acted in good faitt 
in thinking there was a OBA Certificate on file for PCR, Inc., 
there was no proffer to prove that there was a OBA Certificate 
enabling PCR, Inc. to do business under any assumed name. 
Furthermore, nothing in Appendix B of PCR's Brief (which 
Appendix B contains documentary evidence outside the record 
for this case) changes the fact that there never was any 
Certificate of Assumed Name filed with the Utah Secretary of 
State pursuant to which PCR, Inc., as opposed to Reed per-
sonally, was authorized to use the assumed name under which 
PCR, Inc. prosecuted its counterclaim in the case at bar. 
2. In paragraph 30 in the first complete sentence or 
page 22 of PCR's Brief, counsel for PCR states: 
However, Stevenson denied that in fact Volk called 
and told him that Davis had agreed to the purchase. 
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The Transcript at page 343 indicates that Stevenson testified 
he didn't recall such statement being made and that when 
Stevenson was pressed he said he doubted that such statement 
had been made, but that he did not categorically deny that the 
statement had been made to him. On the other hand, Volk, who 
was Stevenson's boss, is very definite in his recollection of 
the conversation. See paragraph 42 t. on page 24 of 
Appellant's original Brief. 
3. In the last sentence of the paragraph ending in 
the middle of page 10 of the Brief of Respondents Unionamerica, 
Ramshire, Inc. and Stevenson (collectively "Unionamerica"), 
counsel for Unionamerica states:. 
A subsequent letter from BTA's counsel indicated 
acquiescence in an escrow agreement (Ex. D-19). 
Note that Ex. D-19 is dated April 17, 1978, which date is just 
prior to the Commission being disbursed upon the closing of 
the subject sale. The correspondence from Appellant's counsel 
as evidenced by Ex. D-19 simply confirmed the understanding 
that all of the Commission would either be paid to Appellant 
or escrowed in lieu of any portion of the Commission being 
disbursed to PCR. Such correspondence did not constitute an 
acquiescense in Unionamerica's conversion of the Commission, 
but was only a memoralization of the fact that money would at 
least not be paid over to PCR. See Ex. P-10, paragraph 13 of 
Ex. P-12, (which agreement Appellant refused to sign) and Ex. 
D-19. 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellant answers Respondents' arguments in the 
following particulars, confining any such answers to new 
matters set forth in Respondents' Briefs: 
POINT I 
EVIDENCE OF WHAT PCR DID AFTER THE BUYER HAD BEEN 
FOUND, THE TRANSACTION NEGOTIATED AND THE PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT SIGNED, DOES NOT ALTER THE CONCLUSION THAT 
UNIONAMERICA WAS THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SUBJECT 
SALE. 
Appellant contends that Unionamerica was the pro-
curing cause of the subject sale, and that pursuant to 
Appellant's rights as the listing broker under the exclusive 
right to sell listing (Ex. P-3, Appendix F), Appellant is 
entitled to 100% of the subject Commission. On the other 
hand, PCR and Unionamerica contend that PCR, Inc. was the 
procuring cause of such sale and is therefore entitled to a 
selling broker's 60% share of the Commission. Nearly all of 
PCR's involvement in the transaction occurred after the Buyer 
had been found, the transaction negotiated and the Purchase 
Agreement signed. This is amply substantiated by the fact 
that nearly 11 pages of PCR's Brief are devoted to trying to 
convince us that PCR, Inc. was the procuring cause of the sale 
because of what PCR did after the Purchase Agreement was 
signed. See PCR' s Brief from the first full paragraph on page 
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23 to the end of paragraph 30 on page 28, and the first full 
paragraph on page 34 to the end of the last full paragraph on 
page 39. See also Unionamerica's Brief in the last paragraph 
on page 17 where it is stated that PCR's most important effort 
came after the Purchase Agreement was signed. 
Unfortunately for Respondents, what happened after 
the Purchase Agreement was signed is of no consequence on the 
issue of who was the procuring cause of the sale. According 
to Utah case law, the subject Commission was earned by bringing 
Unionamerica and the Buyer together -- not the consummation of 
the sale. In Little & Little v. Fleishman, 35 Utah 566, 101 
P. 984 (1909) the Utah Supreme Court had before it a case in 
which the broker had an exclusive right-to-sell listing, a 
purchase agreement had been signed, the owner of the property· 
contended the agreement was merely an option, and the sale 
didn't go through because of the owner's inability to furnish 
a sufficient abstract of title. In that case our Court held: 
The substantial features of the agreement between 
plaintiffs (brokers) and the defendant (owner) are 
that the plaintiffs were employed to effect, not 
consummate, a sale, and were entitled to a 
commission in the event of a sale at any price 
agreed upon. 
In 1954, in Curtis v. Mortensen, l U.2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 
(1954), the foregoing language was quoted with approval and 
said to apply even if the seller and buyer had not entered 
into a written agreement so long as the broker had produced a 
-5-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ready, willing and able buyer. See also the cases collected 
in section 10 of 24 A.L.R. 3d 1160 at page 1179. 
The foregoing legal proposition is entirely consis-
tent with Unionamerica's understanding of the transaction as 
is clear from Stevenson's statement to Taylor in October 1977 
seven months before consummation of the sale -- "There is 
no doubt about it, we owe the $96,000.00, but we just -- we 
feel that we should just give you your 40 and give Skyline 
their 60." See T.94. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S OFFER AND THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE OF THE FAILURE OF PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, 
INC. TO OBTAIN A REAL ESTATE LICENSE AND FILE A 
CERTIFICATE OF ASSUMED NAME WAS NQT IMPROPER. 
Beginning with the last two sentences of the first 
paragraph on page 49 through the first full paragraph on page 
51 of PCR's Brief, PCR contends that it was improper for 
Appellant to present evidence of PCR, Inc.'s failure to file a 
Certificate of Assumed Name and failure to obtain a real estate\ 
license. In making such argument the PCR Brief reads as l 
follows beginning at line 8, page 49: 
The only possible explanation for Appellant's 
waiting until the last day of evidence is that 
Appellant hoped to accomplish an ambush and cause 
this action to not be decided on the merits but 
upon an argument never previously raised. 
That argument completely overlooks the fact that Appellant did 
not introduce the evidence of PCR, Inc.'s failure to file a 
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certificate of Assumed Name until Reed testified that Reed had 
filed such a Certificate for PCR, Inc. See lines 29 and 30 of 
page 637 and lines 1 through 26 of page 638 of the Transcript. 
Accordingly, such evidence was entirely proper for impeachment 
of Reed, because the records of the Office of the Utah Secre-
tary of State show that Reed never did make any such filing . 
for PCR, Inc., as opposed to himself personally. Further, as 
was explained by counsel for Appellant, the issue of PCR, Inc. 
failing to file a Certificate of Assumed Name was not brought 
up until after Reed testified under oath that he had done 
something that he in fact did not do. See T. 640 at lines 27 
and 28. 
It should also be noted that the evidence of PCR, 
Inc.'s failure to obtain a real estate broker's license was 
offered and admitted by the Trial Court on January 17, ·1980, 
and the case was in recess until January 30, 1980, during 
which 13 day period counsel for Respondents had ample oppor-
tunity to rebut such evidence if in fact it could be rebutted. 
See T. 585-589. Is it any wonder then, that the Trial Court 
affirmatively ruled: 
"Well, the rule, of course, indicates that the 
Judge may permit it, and I find that you have not 
been unduly surprised. I suppose these records 
were at least as available to you as they were to 
Plaintiff's counsel, and since they spoke to the 
capacity of the Defendant, whom you represent, I 
suppose that you were in as great or.goo~ of. 
position to determine what his capacity is with 
regard to these corporations and DBAs as the 
Plaintiff is. I don't think you have been unduly 
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surprised by this, so I will admit the exhibits." 
T. 641. 
In light of the foregoing evidentiary rulings, and faced with 
the uncontroverted fact that PCR, Inc., the sole counter-
claimant herein, was not a licensed real estate broke!', at 
page 55 of PCR's Brief it is argued that the Trial Court 
should have granted PCR's motion to substitute Reed as an 
additional claimant in such counterlcaim. That would have 
helped PCR not at all. The counterclaim in this case could 
only have been brought by Ladd Christensen "the broker with 
whom the salesman is connected." See Section 61-2-lS(b) of 
the License Law. As a matter of fact, it would have been 
unlawful for Reed to accept any commission in this instance 
from anyone other than Ladd Christensen for such is prohibited 
by Section 61-2-10 of the License Law which reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any real estate salesman 
to accept a commission or valuable consideration 
for the performance of any of the acts herein 
specified from any person, except his employer, I 
who must be a licensed real estate broker. 
I 
See also both the majority and dissenting opinions in Morris v. [ 
John Price Associates, Inc., Utah, 590 P.2d 315 (1979). ..
1 
According to Exhibits P-45, P-46, P-47 ,. P-48, P-49 and P-50, ano 
T. 630, 631, Ladd Christensen, a sole proprietorship, wast~ I 
only person that could sue appellant for the Commission and at;.: 
time did any of the respondents move to make Ladd Christensen a] 
party to the suit. According to the foregoing authorities, if 
any portion of the commission is to be awarded to PCR, Inc.• Ref 
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and/or Cole, such portion would first have to be awarded to Ladd 
Christensen and he is not even a party to the action. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT EXCUSES PCR, 
INC. FROM NOT BEING LICENSED. 
At lines 8 through 11 on page 53 of PCR's Brief, it 
is asserted: 
PCR has been advised that approximately one-half 
of the companies do not have brokerage licenses in 
the name of the corporations, but in fact maintain 
a license in the names of persons employed by the 
corporations who are brokers. 
That is a pure gratuity. There is nothing in the 
record to substantiate that statement even though counsel for -
PCR had 13 days in which to submit such evidence after the 
time said counsel first learned that PCR, Inc. was not a 
licensed real estate broker as required by Utah law. However, 
even if the statement is taken at face value, it does not 
excuse PCR, Inc. from the licensing requirement, because the 
statement describes a situation that does not apply to PCR, 
Inc. In the case of PCR, Inc., there was nothing in the 
records of the Real Estate Division of the Department of 
Business Regulations of the State of Utah to establish that 
PCR, Inc. was licensed in its own name or in the name of Reed 
or any one else. During the time in question PCR, Inc. was 
not named in any of the records of the Real Estate Division. 
See Ex. P-34 and T.586. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT DOES NOT CONTEND ON APPEAL THAT THERE WAS 
ANY ORAL AGREEMENT OR REFORMED WRITTEN AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN APPELLANT AND UNIONAMERICA THAT UNIONAMERICA 
WOULD REFER WALK-INS TO APPELLANT. 
Beginning at page 21 through the last full paragra~ 
on page 23 of Unionamerica'a Brief, Unionamerica argues that 
there was no oral agreement or reformed written agreement 
between Unionamerica and Appellant to the effect that Union-
america would refer walk-ins to Appellant. In order to save 
the time of the Court and counsel, please be advised that 
while that was an issue before the Trial Court, Appellant has 
not prosecuted any appeal on that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant incorporates by reference its conclusions 
as· contained in Appellant's original Brief. 
Respectfully submitted 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
(_~-/~ 
KENT B LINEBAUGH 
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 532-7700 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of December 
1981, I delivered two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant to F. S. Prince, Jr., Esq. of Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzhaler at 425 East 5th South, Third Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, and Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. of Rooker, Larsen & 
Kimball at 36 South State Street, No. 1800, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, or served same upon said persons by leaving the 
same at their offices with their clerks or other persons in 
charge thereof. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DONN 
c~ ____.,, ~ Ii; 
By: (~~  ($' -- I 
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